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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AND OUTPUT  
IN THE PROBLEMATIC REGIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Economic and debt crisis has increased the attention paid to the development of government expenditure 
in problematic regions in the European Union. The goal of the article is to provide direct empirical evidence 
on cyclicality and the long-term and short-term relationship between government expenditure and output 
in the Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain in a period 1995–2011. We have applied Johansen cointe-
gration test and the error correction model on adjusted annual data of GDP and government expenditure in 
compliance with the COFOG international standard. Research confirms procyclical development of govern-
ment expenditure functions on GDP in the selected countries; this procyclicality is in line with development 
typical for developing countries. Moreover, output and government expenditure are cointegrated for at least 
six of the expenditure categories in every country and it implies a long-term relationship between government 
expenditure and output consistent with Wagner’s law. The values of the coefficients for the short-run rela-
tionship between expenditure and output confirm the voracity hypothesis, as they suggest that in response to 
a given shock to real GDP, government expenditure rises by even more in percentage points.
Keywords: government expenditure, cyclicality, voracity effect, Wagner´s law, COFOG classification, long-run 
elasticity, short-run elasticity
1. Introduction
Economic and debt crisis has increased the 
attention paid to the development of govern-
ment expenditure in problematic regions in 
the European Union. Several members of the 
European Union became historically known 
as PIIGS. These states include Portugal, Italy, 
Ireland, Greece and Spain. The reason why these 
countries were grouped together is the substan-
tial instability of their economies, which was an 
evident problem in 2009. Government expendi-
ture and their growth are seen as an essential 
problem in these countries.
Actually, development of government expend-
iture is often associated with Wagner´s law and 
voracity effect. Wagner‘s law states that govern-
ment activity increases as economies grow, with 
the pace of increase being different for different 
branches of government. Voracity effect occurs if a 
positive shock to income leads to a more than pro-
portional increase in public expenditure, even if 
the shock is expected to be temporary. The vorac-
ity is usually attributed to weak institutions and 
ethnic fractionalization, manifested in the pres-
ence of multiple interest groups seeking to secure 
a greater share of national wealth by demanding 
larger public expenditure on their behalf.
On the other hands, government expenditure 
is an important tool for national governments to 
mitigate the uneven economic development and 
economic shocks across individual countries. From 
a Keynesian perspective, government expendi-
ture should act as a stabilizing force and move in 
a countercyclical direction. Study of [18] points on 
fact that procyclical fiscal policy is generally re-
garded as potentially damaging for welfare: it can 
raise macroeconomic volatility, depress invest-
ment in real and human capital, hamper growth, 
and harm the poor. If expansionary fiscal policies 
in “good times” are not fully offset in “bad times”, 
they may also produce a large deficit bias and lead 
to debt unsustainability and eventual default. If a 
government respect a basic prescription that fis-
cal tools should function counter-cyclical, the op-
timal fiscal policy involves a decreasing of govern-
ment spending in “good times” and a increasing of 
government spending in “bad times.” Procyclical 
fiscal policy is typical for developing countries; 
contrary developed countries mostly use counter-
cyclical policy.
The goal of the article is to provide direct em-
pirical evidence on cyclicality and the long-term 
and short-term relationship between government 
expenditure and output in the Portugal, Ireland, 
Italy, Greece and Spain in a period 1995–2011. 
Previously published studies are weakly supported 
by the data from these problematic regions in 
which results can vary. We apply cointegration ap-
proach on annul data of GDP and government ex-
penditure in compliance with the COFOG interna-
tional standard. The paper is organized as follows. 
In the second section, short literature review is 
summarised. In the third section, we describe the 
dataset and used empirical techniques. Next we 
present the results of government expenditure cy-
clicality and long-run and short-run relationship 
between output and government expenditure. We 
conclude with a summary of key findings.
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2. Literature review 
As [24] mentioned, the economic theory pro-
vides two main categories of arguments that ex-
plain the public sector size in time and among 
countries. The first category has as starting point 
the Wagner law, according to which the elasticity 
of government expenditure compared to GDP is 
greater than one. As countries become more de-
veloped, the demand for public goods raises and 
is consistent with the increasing ability to collect 
the necessary funds. On top of the “Baumol cost 
disease”, explains that the percentage of govern-
ment expenditure increases because the raise of 
public servants’ salaries is higher than their pro-
ductivity, while the price related to public services 
demand is relatively non-elastic. The second cat-
egory of arguments is political. For election pur-
poses, the fiscal policy, especially those concern-
ing the government expenditure tends to be in-
consistent in time and focuses on greater deficits 
and greater public sectors.
The relationship between government expend-
iture and output has often been debated in eco-
nomic literature. [30] proposed that there is a 
long-run tendency for government activities to 
grow relative to total economic aktivity. Wagner 
stated that during the industrialization process, 
as the real income per capita of a country in-
creases, the share of its public expenditure in to-
tal expenditure increases. Three main reasons are 
argued to support this hypothesis: the adminis-
trative and regulatory functions of the state, the 
cultural and welfare services and the state partic-
ipation to finance large-scale projects for tech-
nological needs. It means that government grows 
because there is an increasing demand for public 
goods and for the control of externalities.
The existing literature testing Wagner‘s law 
varies considerably in terms of the dependent and 
independent variables chosen to “test” the law. 
Wagner originally proposed that as industriali-
zation or social progress proceeded, public sec-
tors would grow in relative importance. As [17] 
summed up, the empirical works on Wagner’s law 
can be divided in two groups, based on the different 
types of used econometric methodology: (1) stud-
ies which are performed until the mid-1990s, as-
sume stationary data series and apply simple OLS 
(ordinary least squares) regressions to test alter-
native versions of the law; (2) cointegration-based 
studies, which are performed from the mid-1990s 
and on, test for cointegration mostly between gov-
ernment expenditure and national income. Early 
studies of this group use the methodology of [5], 
whereas more recent works mostly apply the tech-
nique of [14]. Many recent studies also perform 
Granger causality tests to indicate the direction of 
causality between the variables.
The empirical studies have produced mixed 
and sometimes contradictory results. Some of 
these conflicting conclusions have been attrib-
uted due to using the different econometric meth-
odology and the different features characterizing 
different economies during alternative time peri-
ods. Above that, [25] pointed out on the fact that 
there are at least 14 different measures of govern-
ment expenditure that have been used in the lit-
erature (e.g. government expenditure at current 
prices, government expenditure plus transfers at 
current prices, government expenditure at con-
stant prices, government expenditure plus trans-
fers at constant prices, government consumption 
expenditure at current prices, government con-
sumption expenditure at constant prices, central 
government expenditure only, government capital 
expenditure at constant prices, etc.), and at least 
13 different possible measures of output (e.g. total 
output Y, output per capita, proportion of Y gener-
ated in manufacturing sector, proportion of Y gen-
erated in primary sector, permanent income, ex-
ports plus imports divided by Y, etc.).
[4] investigated empirically the traditional 
Wagner’s hypothesis in the case of Greece us-
ing disaggregated data of public expenditures 
and employing an error correction approach. 
The empirical findings confirmed Wagner’s law 
only in the case of military expenditure. [29] an-
alysed the experience of six developed economies 
(Denmark, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden and 
the UK) from the mid-19th century to 1913, and 
reported results in accordance with the Wagner´s 
law. [17] applied six alternative functional forms, 
using data for the EU-15 countries over the time 
period 1949-1998. The results are ambiguous ac-
cordingly to the method applied. The major points 
that emerge from the Engle and Granger test are 
that in most of the EU countries, no long term re-
lationship has been observed, except for some 
subcases in Finland, Italy and the Netherlands. In 
contrast, the Johansen test supports the existence 
of Wagner’s law in most EU countries, with the ex-
ception of France and Italy. As far as the Granger 
causality test is concerned, patterns of causality 
between income and government expenditure dis-
play dramatic differences across various countries. 
Moreover, there is limited support for the pattern 
of causality; Wagner’s law was completely verified 
only in Finland and Italy. [8] analyzed the evidence 
of the USA, United Kingdom, France, Germany 
and Italy for the period 1870-1990. They observed 
that the increase in the public expenditure to na-
tional income ratio is faster for the period until 
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the mid-20th century and develop a model based 
on Wagner’s law.
Next, [2] examined the short- and long-term 
behaviour of government spending with respect 
to output in 51 developing countries using an er-
ror-correction model. They find evidence that is 
consistent with the existence of cyclical ratcheting 
and voracity in government spending in develop-
ing countries, resulting in a tendency for govern-
ment spending to rise over time. They presented 
three main policy conclusions of the research: (1) 
the long-term and short-term elasticity of capital 
spending in relation to GDP is relatively high; (2) 
there may be scope for fiscal rules or fiscal respon-
sibility laws in some countries that limit the dis-
cretion for pro-cyclical fiscal policy; (3) in many 
countries, there is a long-term relationship be-
tween the level of output and government spend-
ing. Sideris (2007) investigates the long-run ten-
dency for government expenditure to grow rela-
tive to national income using Greek data from 
1833 to 1938. Cointegration analysis validates 
the existence of long-run relationship between 
the variables, as expressed by the six most popu-
lar versions of the Law. Moreover, Granger causal-
ity tests indicate causality running from the varia-
bles approximating income to the government ex-
penditure variable.
Also [19] analysed the development of public 
expenditure and aggregate income in 23 OECD 
countries. Using panel cointegration, the empiri-
cal evidence provides findings of a structural pos-
itive correlation between public spending and per 
capita income, consistent with the Wagner’s law. 
The correlation is usually higher in countries with 
lower per capita income, suggesting that the pe-
riod of catching-up is characterized by a stronger 
development of public activities than more ma-
ture economies.
[23] studied the linkages between public ex-
penditure and GDP for Italy. Empirical evidence 
suggests that only for gross public investment 
expenditure the hypothesis is satisfied. Instead, 
Granger-causality brings unclear results. Next 
[22] examined the empirical evidence of Wagner’s 
law and of Augmented Wagner’s law, according to 
which subsists a long-term relationship amongst 
public expenditure on one side and aggregate in-
come and public deficit on the other side. He 
has employed six alternative functional forms 
of Wagner’s law, using data for the EU-27 coun-
tries over time period 1970-2009. With regard to 
Keynesian hypothesis, he has found no clear evi-
dence of government expenditure causing national 
income and he has concluded that the Keynesian 
proposition of government expenditure as a policy 
instrument to encourage and lead growth in the 
economy is not supported by the data used.
As well, [27] provided direct empirical evi-
dence on cyclicality and the long-term and short-
term relationship between government spending 
and output in eight Central and Eastern European 
countries in a period 1995–2009. The results con-
firm cyclical development of government spend-
ing on GDP, Wagner´s law and voracity effect in 
the most CEE countries.
The literature testing the cyclicality of gov-
ernment expenditure also provides variety of re-
sults. Many of researches as [11] and [12] focused 
on Latin America. On the one hand, [9] showed in 
his research that expenditure is countercyclical. 
However, other papers have shown no discernible 
pattern. [7] documented for G7 countries, the cor-
relation between government consumption and 
output indeed appears to show no pattern and be 
clustered around zero. The differences in these re-
sults depend on the components of expenditure 
being measured. Government transfers and subsi-
dies are found to have become substantially more 
countercyclical.
Contrary to the theory, many of empirical stud-
ies have found evidence that government expend-
iture is procyclical. Analysis of [20] found procycli-
cality in a single-country time series study of Irish 
fiscal policy. Later [21] showed that the level of cy-
clicality varies across expenditure categories and 
across OECD countries. [28] concluded that fiscal 
procyclicality is evident in a much wider sample of 
countries. [13], [16], [3], [26] or [10] presented sim-
ilar conclusions. [1] tested differences in the cy-
clicality of government expenditure across func-
tional categories. Their evidence from 20 OECD 
countries suggests that procyclicality is more 
likely in smaller functional budgets, but capital 
expenditure is more likely to be procyclical for the 
larger expenditure categories.
3. Data and methodology
In this paper we adopt the simplest formula-
tion of Wagner‘s law by focusing on the relation-
ship between aggregate economic activity and 
government expenditure in compliance with the 
COFOG international standard. Most studies ana-
lyzing the cyclicality of government expenditure 
and output have used a panel data methodology 
that has not fully exploited the time-series prop-
erties of the data. On the other hand, studies test-
ing for a long-run relationship, such as Wagner‘s 
law, have ignored the short-term aspects of this 
relationship. In the literature on cyclicality, many 
studies use panel data models that are not well 
suited to exploring short-term versus long-term 
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relationships. We exploit both the time-series and 
cross-sectional aspects using an error-correction 
framework.
The dataset consists of annual data on GDP 
and government expenditure in compliance with 
the COFOG international standard during the pe-
riod 1995–2011. It is not possible to use longer 
and higher frequently time series data as COFOG 
classification analyzes and reports only annual 
data. The countries included in the analysis are 
Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. All time 
series are collected from the Eurostat database 
and adjusted at constant prices (deflators in 2005 
prices are taken from the World Bank). In line with 
[2], we investigated fiscal and output co-move-
ments by the approach proposed by [21]. We es-
timated the elasticity of government expenditure 
with respect to output, based on country-by-coun-
try time-series regressions. Next we used an er-
ror-correction approach, which allows us to dis-
tinguish between the short-term effect of output 
on government spending and any longer-term ef-
fect between these two variables. Most of the re-
sults were calculated in econometric program 
Eviews 7.
Many studies point out that using non-station-
ary macroeconomic variable in time series anal-
ysis causes superiority problems in regression. 
Thus, a unit root test should precede any empiri-
cal study employing such variables. We decided to 
make the decision on the existence of a unit root 
through Augmented Dickey — Fuller test (ADF 
test). The equation (1) is formulated for the sta-
tionary testing.




t t i t i t
i
x t x x u− −
=
∆ = δ +δ +δ + α ∆ +∑          (1)
ADF test is used to determine a unit root xt at 
all variables in the time t. Variable ∆xt–i expresses 
the lagged first difference and ut estimate auto-
correlation error. Coefficients δ0, δ1, δ2 and αi are 
estimated. Zero and the alternative hypothesis for 
the existence of a unit root in the xt variable are 
specified in (2).
H0: δ2 = 0, Hε: δ2 < 0. (2)
Testing the stationary is the essential assump-
tion for implementation of cointegration ap-
proach. It is necessary to confirm that time se-
ries are non-stationary at level data but station-
ary at first difference. The results of ADF test con-
firmed the stationary of all time series on the first 
diference.
We suppose there is a steady-state relation-
ship between government expenditure and output 
given by (3).
,G AY δ=                                 (3)
G represents government expenditure, Y 
means output and Eq. (3) can also be written in 
linear form:
log log ,     log .G a Y a A= +δ =                (4)
If the adjustment of government expenditure 
G to its steady-state G is gradual, then the level 
of government expenditure will respond to tran-
sitory changes in output, and G will move gradu-
ally toward its steady-state, or equilibrium level. 
To capture this gradual move, we specify a gen-
eral autoregressive distributed lag specification 
for spending category i in period t: 
1 0 1 1log   log log log ,it it t t tG G Y Y− −=µ+α +β +β +ε
|α|<1                                    (5) 
We can solve for the static, steady-state equi-
librium by assuming that output is at its steady-
state level Y and ignoring the error term:




= + δ= −α
−α −α
     (6)
More generally, we could allow output to grow 
at rate g. In this case, the only difference is that 






depends on g. To reflect the steady state, (5) can 
be rearranged as the error correction model (7).
( )0 1 1log   log log .logit t it t tG Y G Y− −=µ+β +γ −δ +ε (7)
In (7), we can interpret β0∆logYt as the short-
term impact of output on government expenditure 
and β0 as the short-run elasticity of government 
expenditure with respect to output. The error cor-
rection term γ(logGit–1 – δlogYt–1) captures devia-
tions from the steady-state, or long-run equilib-
rium, where δ is the long-run elasticity of govern-
ment expenditure with respect to output, and γ 
is the rate at which government expenditure ad-
justs to past disequilibrium. μ is constants of the 
model, εt means residual component of long-term 
relationship.
Above that, (7) can be rewritten as (8) and then 
used to test if there is a long-run relationship be-
tween government spending and output. In par-
ticular, following [6], if γ is significantly differ-
ent from zero in (8), then output and government 
spending are cointegrated.
0 1 1log   log log ,logit t it t tG Y G Y− −=µ+β +γ −ϕ +ε  (8)
where φ = γδ. The above derivation makes clear 
the underlying assumption that there is a elastic-
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ity relationship between output and expenditure, 
while the transitory deviations are random.
4. Results and discussion
4.1 The structure of government expenditure
The structure and an amount of government 
expenditure is very important for economic policy 
of each country as it can help in overcoming the 
inefficiencies of the market as well as in smooth-
ing out cyclical fluctuations in the economy. We 
used government expenditure in compliance with 
the COFOG (Classification of the Functions of 
Government) international standard in our analy-
sis. The COFOG is one of the four classifications of 
expenditure according to purpose (functional clas-
sifications) used in the national accounts. COFOG 
classifies government expenditure into ten main 
categories / divisions:
— CF01: General public services 
— CF02: Defense 
— CF03: Public order and safety
— CF04: Economic affairs
— CF05: Environment protection
— CF06: Housing and community amenities
— CF07: Health
— CF08: Recreation; culture and religion
— CF09: Education
— CF10: Social protection
Figure 1 shows development of government 
expenditure in the selected countries in a period 
1995–2011. Government expenditure relative to 
GDP progressively decreased in the PIIGS, except 
Greece, between 1995 and 2000, next stagnated 
till 2006, followed by a rise in 2007 and 2008 and 
a more emphatic increase in 2009, the end of the 
analyzed period is characterized by a slight de-
crease or stagnation. The development is influ-
enced by the consequences of the economic and 
financial crisis. The related need for public inter-
vention are the main factors behind the upward 
trend between 2008 and 2009, and its remaining 
high level in 2010, as the breakdown of expend-
iture by functions confirms. The main contribu-
tors to the increase in expenditures were social 
protection and health (for details look at Eurostat 
database). For example, government expenditure 
reached 67% of GDP in Ireland in 2010, whereas 
it was the countries with the lowest levels until 
2008. This jump is largely explained by specific 
government support to banks during the financial 
crisis, in the form of capital injections. This type of 
support is classified as government expenditure in 
certain conditions (it belongs to CF04). 
The average value of total government expend-
iture is the smallest in Ireland (38% GDP), the 
highest in Italy (50% GDP), while the average is 
48% GDP in the whole EU15. It means that the av-
erage value of total expenditure in PIIGS, except 
Italy, is lower than the average value in the EU15, 
although these countries are often criticized for 
the excessive government expenditure.
Table 1 shows the average share of government 
expenditure by functions on total expenditure in 
each analyzed country during the selected period. 
Data states sizeable differences in importance of 
public sector and a priority of government ex-
Fig. 1. Development of government expenditure (in % GDP). Source: authors´ compilation based on data from Eurostat
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penditure functions and confirms that these prob-
lematic countries are not a homogenous group.
The three biggest expenditure functions, on 
average, account nearly 65% of the total expend-
iture: Social protection, Health and General pub-
lic services. In the PIIGS as a whole as well as in all 
individual member states, social protection is the 
most important function of government expend-
iture. Social protection expenditure (CF10) takes 
the third of all government expenditure in average. 
It contains, for example, expenditure on sickness 
and disability, old age, survivors, family and chil-
dren, unemployment, housing, social exclusion 
and R&D social protection. The highest value of 
CF10 is in Italy, although the value decreased by 10 
percentage points in selected period (from 26.7% 
to 16.4%). On the other hand, the average value 
is less than a half in Ireland. The value of General 
public services (CF01) is the second highest cate-
gory (17%). We can find the highest value of CF01 
in Greece (23.86%), followed by Italy (21.66%); it 
is due to a high expenditure on public debt ser-
vices. On the other hand, Ireland has the smallest 
CF01 expenditure (less than 11%). Economics af-
fairs (CF04) and (CF09) Education expenditure are 
in average very similar (11.18% resp. 11.06%), but 
the share differs in each country. Education ex-
penditure is twice as high in Portugal as in Greece. 
Contrary, Greece has the absolutely highest ex-
penditure on Defense (CF02) compare to the rest 
of the PIIGS in analyzed period.
4.2 Cyclicality of government expenditure
As was already noted, government expendi-
ture is a possible automatic stabilizer. The cycli-
cality of government expenditure is typically de-
fined in terms of how expenditure moves with the 
output gap. If government expenditure increases 
when there is a positive output gap, then expend-
iture is countercyclical. If potential output were 
observable or easy to estimate, one could define 
counter-cyclicality as above-average expenditure 
to output ratio whenever output was below its 
potential.
As [2] mention, measuring potential output is 
difficult. As a consequence, it is not easy to discuss 
business cycles or cyclicality per se. Therefore we 
focus on co-movements of government expendi-
ture and output as a proxy for cyclicality.
Table 2 reports the estimates of the adjust-
ment coefficient γ from equation (7), which is es-
timated by OLS with a correction for an autore-
gressive error term. γ is the rate at which govern-
ment expenditure adjusts to past disequilibrium. 
In cases where γ is significant, we can conclude 
there is a cointegrating relationship between gov-
ernment expenditure and output. The results in-
dicate significant difference across expenditure 
functions. There is a long-term relationship be-
tween total government expenditure and output 
consistent with Wagner‘s law, the share of signif-
icant results is 68% for all categories in all coun-
tries. Although the error correction term is not 
significant for all expenditure functions in any 
country of the sample, all countries have a signif-
icant error correction term for at least six of the 
expenditure functions (six in Greece and Spain, 
seven in Ireland and Portugal and eight in Italy). 
Moreover, the error correction term for General 
public services (CF01), Defense (CF02) Education 
(CF09) and Social protection (CF10) are significant 
in all countries. As expected, the adjustment coef-
ficients are mostly negative (in 86% of cases), in-
dicating dynamic stability. These findings are in 
line with [2], as they have found that all adjust-
ment coefficients are negative and although the 
error correction term is significant in about 30% 
of countries in the sample for all expenditure ag-
gregates, 70% of the sample countries have a sig-
nificant error correction term for at least one of 
spending aggregates. Similarly, the error correc-
tion term not significant for all expenditure func-
tions in any CEE country of the sample, all coun-
tries have a significant error correction term for at 
least four of the spending functions and the ad-
justment coefficients are mostly negative ([27]).
The implication of a significant error correction 
term is that there is in fact a long-term relation-
ship between government expenditure and output. 
But it is suitable to point out that the existence 
of cointegration does not imply causality, which 
Table 1
Government expenditure — COFOG classification (in % of total G)
Country CF01 CF02 CF03 CF04 CF05 CF06 CF07 CF08 CF09 CF10
Greece 23.86% 6.11% 2.58% 11.19% 1.17% 0.81% 11.50% 0.85% 7.19% 34.73%
Spain 13.95% 2.77% 4.67% 12.03% 2.13% 2.53% 13.63% 3.51% 10.99% 33.80%
Ireland 10.72% 1.61% 4.51% 13.70% 2.34% 4.33% 17.64% 1.81% 13.17% 30.18%
Italy 21.66% 2.67% 3.99% 8.58% 1.65% 1.72% 12.73% 1.71% 9.47% 35.81%
Portugal 15.18% 3.29% 4.21% 10.42% 1.43% 1.78% 14.72% 2.68% 14.50% 31.81%
Average 17.08% 3.29% 3.99% 11.18% 1.74% 2.24% 14.04% 2.11% 11.06% 33.27%
Source: authors´ compilation based on data from Eurostat.
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is consistent with Wagner‘s view that there is not 
necessarily a cause and effect relationship between 
economic development and government activity.
Table 3 summarizes the results about the long- 
run elasticity of expenditure with respect to out-
put. The long-run elasticity coefficient δ is signif-
icant in 84% cases. A positive value of δ is consist-
ent with a wider interpretation of Wagner‘s law, as 
it implies that government expenditure rises with 
national income. If δ is higher than one then this 
would be consistent with a narrow interpretation 
of Wagner‘s law, where government expenditure 
rises faster than national income.
The long-term elasticity of government ex-
penditure and output δ is mostly positive (in 92% 
of cases) and it is in line with a wider interpreta-
tion of Wagner‘s law; the highest elasticity coeffi-
cient is for Public order and safety (CF03) due to 
the extremely high δ in Italy (it greatly increased 
the average). Moreover, δ is for total expenditure 
larger than one (1.17), average value is 1.30 for all 
expenditure functions. It is in accordance with the 
narrow interpretation of Wagner‘s law and indi-
cates that in the long-term, the public sector is in-
creasing in relative importance. The coefficient for 
long-run elasticity was significant in all countries 
for all expenditure functions with the exception of 
Public order and safety (CF03), Environment pro-
tection (CF05) and Housing and community amen-
ities (CF06). In Table 3, we can also find the long-
Table 2
The value of adjustment coefficient γ
country G total CF01 CF02 CF03 CF04 CF05 CF06 CF07 CF08 CF09 CF10
Greece
–0.91* 0.32* –0.60* –0.25 –1.28* –0.01 –0.49 0.03 –0.80* –1.10* –0.39*
(0.45) (0.09) (0.22) (0.34) (0.30) (0.12) (0.31) (0.11) (0.28) (0.45) (0.20)
Spain
0.23* 0.37* –0.37* 0.41 –1.18* –0.29 –0.17 –0.17* –0.35 –0.04* 0.05*
(0.06) (0.15) (0.19) (0.41) (0.34 (0.21) (0.32) (0.07) (0.25) (0.02) (0.03
Ireland
0.29 –0.01* –0.32* 0.23* 1.41 –0.04 –0.91* –0.18** 0.28 –0.06* –0.28*
(0.18) (0.00) (0.14) (0.12) (1.03) (0.05) (0.39) (0.11) (0.36) (0.02) (0.07)
Italy
–0.00 –0.56** –0.27* –0.07* –0.62* –0.39* –0.66* –0.31** –0.13 –0.31* –0.34**
(0.03) (0.18) (0.11) (0.34) (0.24) (0.16) (0.30) (0.08) (0.24) (0.11) (0.09)
Portugal
–0.01 –0.69** –1.11* –0.06 –0.40 –0.23* –0.52* –0.02 –0.48* –0.56* –0.16**
(0.11) (0.14) (0.37) (0.19) (0.43) (0.13) (0.14) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.05)
Average 0.57 0.39 0.53 0.23 1.2 0.31 0.69 0.22 0.64 0.41 0.24
Share significant 40% 100% 100% 20% 60% 40% 60% 60% 40% 100% 100%
Note: Symbols * and ** and denote significance at the 1% and 5% level, standard deviation are in parenthesis. Average means average 
absolute values of significant coefficients only. Share significant means share of significant cases.
Source: authors´ calculations.
Table 3
The long–run elasticity coefficient δ
Country G total CF01 CF02 CF03 CF04 CF05 CF06 CF07 CF08 CF09 CF10
Greece
1.02* –1.50* 1.43* 4.20** 0.88** 0.58 1.19** 0.76** 2.69* 2.07** 0.78**
(0.06) (0.27) (0.55) (0.32) (0.14) (0.01) (0.23) (0.01) (0.30) (0.15) (0.09)
Spain
–0.06 –0.65** 0.74** 0.81** 1.23** 1.37** –0.20 1.94** 0.98** 2.85* 0.91**
(0.13) (0.14) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.32) (0.33) (0.10) (0.93) (0.01)
Ireland
0.36* 1.38** 0.55** 0.14 0.56** 0.13 1.11** 1.20** 0.79** 2.46** 0.86**
(0.15) (0.21) (0.01) (0.14) (0.08) (0.59) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09) (0.61) (0.01)
Italy
0.94** –1.97** 1.36* 3.13** 0.77** 1.66** 0.58** 2.37** 1.96** 0.78** 0.88**
(0.01) (0.18) (0.62) (0.41) (0.01) (0.18) (0.00) (0.27) (0.21) (0.00) (0.14)
Portugal
2.34** 0.77** 0.64* 0.68** 0.73** –0.22** 0.58** 2.55** 0.63** 0.77** 0.89**
(0.40) (0.01) (0.0) (0.02) (0.00) (0.72 (0.01 (0.25) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Average 1.17 1.26 0.95 2.20 0.83 1.08 0.86 1.76 1.41 1.79 0.86
Share significant 80% 100% 100% 80% 100% 60% 80% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Note: Symbols * and ** and denote significance at the 1% and 5% level, standard deviation are in parenthesis. Average means average 
absolute values of significant coefficients only. Share significant means share of significant cases.
Source: authors´ calculations.
197
ЭКОНОМИКА РЕГИОНА № 4/2013
I. Szarowská
run δ lower than one, it means that the expendi-
ture function rises slower than national income.
Table 4 summarizes results about the short-
run elasticity of expenditure with respect to out-
put. The results and conclusions for the short-
run elasticity are not so unequivocal. For all ex-
penditure categories, the average coefficient is 
2.09. Although the short-run elasticity is positive 
for 79% of the cases in the sample, it´s needed to 
points out on 51% statistical significant of results. 
However, the coefficient value above one is con-
sistent with the voracity hypothesis, as it suggests 
that in response to a given shock to real GDP, gov-
ernment expenditure rises by even more in per-
centage points.
The Public order and safety expenditure 
(CF03) indicates the highest short-run elastic-
ity, with a mean coefficient of 2.59 for the 80% of 
cases where the coefficient is significant. This im-
plies that governments cut and expand CF03 ex-
penditure proportionally more during recessions 
and expansions, respectively, than other types of 
expenditure.
Elasticity results confirm conclusions of ear-
lier studies ([29], [21], [2], [1], [27]). But the size of 
the elasticity with respect to output varies greatly 
across countries. Following [21], we try to explain 
the cross-country variation in the short-term 
elasticity, using a wide range of variables, includ-
ing output volatility, index for power dispersion, 
per capita GDP, the standard deviation of terms 
of trade volatility or financial risk. However, the 
results were not statistically significant. On the 
other hand, [22] did not find clear evidence be-
tween government expenditure and GDP, but he 
used panel data instead of separate time series.
5. Conclusion
The aim of this article was to provide direct em-
pirical evidence on cyclicality and the long-term 
and short-term relationship between government 
expenditure and output in the Portugal, Ireland, 
Italy, Greece and Spain in a period 1995–2011. We 
analysed cyclically adjusted annual data in com-
pliance with the COFOG international standard.
We used Johansen cointegration test and the 
error correction model [15]. Output and govern-
ment expenditure are cointegrated for at least six 
of the expenditure functions in every country and 
it implies a long-term relationship between gov-
ernment expenditure and output. The government 
expenditure functions are procyclical in most 
countries (68% cases in the sample). Average value 
of long-run elasticity coefficient is 1.30 for all ex-
penditure functions, 1.17 for total government ex-
penditure. It is consistent with the wider inter-
pretation of Wagner‘s law and indicates that the 
public sector is increasing in relative importance 
in the long-term. The δ coefficient was significant 
in each country for all expenditure functions with 
the exception of Public order and safety (CF03), 
Environment protection (CF05) and Housing and 
community amenities (CF06).
The research focused also on short-run rela-
tionship between expenditure and output. Results 
are not unambiguous due to a relatively low sta-
tistical significance (51%). However, the coeffi-
cient values (average is 2.09) confirm the voracity 
hypothesis, as they suggest that in response to a 
given shock to real GDP, government expenditure 
rises by even more in percentage points.
When comparing the short-run and the long-
run coefficients for countries where there is a long-
Table 4
The short–run elasticity coefficient β 
G total CF01 CF02 CF03 CF04 CF05 CF06 CF07 CF08 CF09 CF10
Greece
–0.54 2.34* 5.97* 4.23* 0.96 1.92* 0.96 3.45* –4.02 0.12 0.47
(1.14) (0.83) (2.07) (2.36) (1.73) (0.80) (1.38) (1.33) (2.56) (1.62) (0.62)
Spain
1.21** 1.01* 0.19 2.11* –0.29 –0.65 0.38 0.79* –0.29 0.89** 1.21*
(0.21) (0.54) (0.34) (1.10) (0.76) (0.88) (2.28) (0.33) (1.24) (0.22) (0.51
Ireland
–0.20 –0.63 0.83* 1.39* 1.11 1.43* –1.65 –1.25* 2.92* 0.55* –1.44*
(0.70) (0.39) (0.31) (0.48) (4.68) (0.60) (1.52) (0.49) (1.50) (0.15) (0.58)
Italy
0.44* 1.05* –0.43 0.18 0.52 0.64 –0.35 –0.55 1.14* 0.60* –0.67**
(0.23) (0.50) (0.77) (0.89) (1.53) (0.38) (5.01) (0.36) (0.55) (0.27) (0.22)
Portugal
0.07 –0.69** 1.00 –2.63* 0.49 0.19 4.38* 1.13* 0.49 0.42 –1.34*
(0.35) (0.14) (0.76) (1.24) (1.14) (0.91) (1.30) (0.57) (0.84) (0.88) (0.69)
Average 0.83 1.27 3.40 2.59 – 1.68 4.38 1.65 2.3 0.68 1.16
Share significant 40% 80% 40% 80% 0% 40% 20% 80% 40% 60% 80%
Note: Symbols * and ** and denote significance at the 1% and 5% level, standard deviation are in parenthesis. Average means aver-
age absolute values of significant coefficients only. Share significant means share of significant cases.
Source: authors´ calculations.
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term relationship between government spending 
and output, we find that in most cases, the short-
run elasticity is larger than that for the short term. 
This is similar with development in Central and 
Eastern European countries ([27]), but opposite 
findings are in most developing countries, where 
the long-run elasticity is larger than that for the 
short term in 65% of cases ([2]).
We can conclude that although the theory im-
plies government expenditure is countercyclical; 
our research does not prove that and this procy-
clicality is in line with development typical for de-
veloping countries. The results confirm procyclical 
development of government expenditure on GDP, 
Wagner´s law and voracity effect in PIIGS coun-
tries during 1995–2011. Our result is in consist-
ent with the empirical literature using the identi-
cal methodology.
Research behind this paper was supported by the grant GAČR 403/11/2073 „Procyclicality of financial markets, asset price bubbles 
and macroprudential regulation“.
References
1. A. Abbott, P. Jones, Procyclical government spending: Patterns of pressure and prudence in the OECD, Economics Letters 
111 (2011), 230–232.
2. B. Akitoby, B. Clements, S. Gupta, G. Inchauste, Public spending, voracity, and Wagner‘s law in developing countries, 
European Journal of Political Economy 22, (2006), 908–924.
3. A. Alesina, F.R. Campante, G. Tabellini, Why is ﬁscal policy often procyclical? Journal of the European Economic Association 
6 (2008), 1006–1030. 
4. M. Cletsos, C. Kollias, Testing Wagner’s Law using disaggregated data in the case of Greece: 1958-93, Applied Economics 29 
(1997), 371–377.
5. R.F. Engle, C.W.J. Granger, Co-integration and error-correction: representation, estimation and testing, Econometrica 55 
(1987), 251–276.
6. N. Ericsson, J. Mckinnon, Finite sample properties of error correction tests for cointegration, Econometrics Journal 5 (2002), 
285–318.
7. R. Fiorito, T. Kollintzas, Stylized facts of business cycles in the G7 from a real business cycles perspective, European Economic 
Review 38 (1994), 235–269.
8. M. Florio, S. Colautti, A Logistic Growth Theory of Public Expenditures: A Study of Five Countries over 100 Years, Public 
Choice 122 (2005), 355–393.
9. J. Galí, Government size and macroeconomic stability, European Economic Review 38 (1994), 117–132. 
10. G. Ganelli, The International Effects of Government Spending Composition, Economic Modelling 27 (2010), 631–640.
11. M. Gavin, R. Hausmann, R. Perotti, E. Talvi, Managing Fiscal Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean: Volatility, 
Procyclicality, and Limited Creditworthiness, IDB Working Paper No. 326 (1996).
12. M. Gavin, R. Perotti, Fiscal policy in Latin America, Macroeconomics Annual 12 (1997), 11–70.
13. Z. Hercowitz, M. Strawczynski, Cyclical Ratcheting in Government Spending: Evidence from the OECD, Review of 
Economics and Statistics 86 (2004), 353–361.
14. S. Johansen, Statistical analysis of cointegration vectors, Journal of Economics Dynamics and Control 12 (1988), 231–254.
15. S. Johansen, Cointegration and Hypothesis Testing of Cointegration Vectors in Gaussian Vector Autoregressive Models, 
Econometrica 59 (1991), 1551–1580.
16. G.L. Kaminsky, C.M. Reinhart, C. A. Vegh, When it Rains, it Pours: Procyclical Capital Flows and Macroeconomic Policies, 
Nber Macoeconomics Annual (2004), pp. 11–53. 
17. S. Karagianni, M. Pempetzoglou, S. Strikou, Testing Wagner’s Law For The European Union Economies, The Journal of 
Applied Business Research 18 (2002), 107–114.
18. A. Kraay, L. Serven, Fiscal Policy Response to the Current Financial Crisis: Issues for Developing Countries, World Bank 
Research, Washington, DC, 2008. 
19. S. Lamartina, A. Zaghini, Increasing Public Expenditures: Wagner’s Law in OECD Countries, Center for Financial Studies 
Working Papers No. 13 (2008).
20. P.R. Lane, International Perspectives on the Irish Economy, Economic and Social Review 29 (1998), 217-222.
21. P.R. Lane, The Cyclical Behaviour of Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the OECD, Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003), 
2661–2675.
22. C. Magazzino, Wagner’s Law and Augmented Wagner’s Law in EU-27. A Time-Series Analysis on Stationarity, Cointegration 
and Causality, International Research Journal of Finance and Economics 89 (2012), 205–220.
23. C. Magazzino, “Wagner’s Law” in Italy: Empirical Evidence from 1960 to 2008, Global & Local Economic Review 14 (2010), 
91–116.
24. M. Mutascu, M. Milos, Optimal Size of Government Spending. The Case of European Union Member States, Annales 
Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica 11 (2009), 447–456. 
25. A. Peacock, A. Scott, The curious attraction of Wagner‘s law, Public Choice 102 (2000), 1–17.
26. A.S. Rajkumar, V. Swaroop, Public Spending and Outcomes: Does Governance Matter? Journal of Development Economics 
86 (2008), 96–111.
199
ЭКОНОМИКА РЕГИОНА № 4/2013
Р. И. Маликов, В. И. Харисов
27. I. Szarowská, Public Spending Cyclicality and Wagner’s Law in Central and Eastern European Countries, Acta Universitatis 
Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendeleianae Brunensis 60 (2012), 383–390. 
28. E. Talvi, C. A. Vegh, Tax base variability and procyclical fiscal policy in developing countrie, Journal of Development 
Economics 78 (2005), 156–190.
29. J. Thornton, Cointegration, Causality and Wagner’s Law in 19th Century Europe, Applied Economic Letters 6 (1999), 413–
416.
30. A. Wagner, Staat in nationalökonomischer Hinsicht. Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften. Jena: Fischer, 1911, pp. 
743–745.
Information about the author
Irena Szarowská (Karvina, Czech Republic) — Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Finance, Silesian University, School 
of Business Administration (Univerzitni nam. 1934/3, 733 40 Karvina, Czech Republic, e-mail: szarowska@opf.slu.cz).
УДК [338.49:334.027]:332.146
Р. И. Маликов, В. И. Харисов
РАЗРАБОТКА ИНСТРУМЕНТАРИЯ ОЦЕНКИ РИСКОВ РЕАЛИЗАЦИИ 
ИНФРАСТРУКТУРНЫХ ПРОЕКТОВ РАЗВИТИЯ ПРЕДПРИНИМАТЕЛЬСТВА
В представленной работе рассматриваются организационно-экономические и институцио-
нальные аспекты реализации инфраструктурных проектов в Российской Федерации. Основная цель 
работы заключается в попытке систематизации параметров развития национальной экономики 
по критериям качества и доступности инфраструктуры для отечественного бизнеса. По мнению 
авторов статьи, эффективное решение проблемы модернизации инфраструктуры предпринима-
тельства в регионах может быть получено в результате взаимодействия государства, обществен-
ных и бизнес-структур для достижения консолидации их совместных усилий. Однако несовершен-
ство институционально-правового поля взаимодействия институтов власти и бизнеса может 
стать существенным барьером при реализации проектов инфраструктурного обеспечения хозяй-
ственной деятельности субъектов предпринимательства. По этой причине необходимо повысить 
лояльность и взаимовыгодность отношений профильных структур государственной власти и ком-
мерческих организаций по развитию инфраструктурного комплекса в контексте удовлетворения 
взаимных ожиданий сторон на всех этапах взаимодействия.
С использованием методов теории нечетких множеств исследователями представлены модели 
оценки рисков реализации инфраструктурных проектов. Применение модели позволит проводить 
обоснование целесообразности участия бизнес-структуры в формировании инфраструктурного 
ресурса с учетом формирующихся потенциальных выгод при складывающихся уровнях риска.
Ключевые слова: инфраструктура, предпринимательство, институты, оценка риска, деловая среда, ло-
яльность бизнеса и власти
В условиях растущей межрегиональной вза-
имной интеграции и конкуренции регионов 
на мезо- и макроуровне на рынках инвести-
ций, капитала, квалифицированной рабочей 
силы решающим фактором обеспечения дол-
говременных устойчивых преимуществ в ре-
гиональном развитии становится реализация 
комплексных программ регионального мар-
кетинга, отражающих ценностные ориентиры 
регионов как формирующихся целостных тер-
риториальных образований с собственными 
деловыми интересами. Идеология региональ-
ного маркетинга ориентирована на создание 
социально привлекательного статуса и укре-
пление положительного имиджа территории 
как сообщества партнеров — региональной ад-
министрации, предприятий промышленности 
и сферы услуг, институтов региональной ин-
фраструктуры, общественных организаций, 
ориентированных на потребности целевых 
групп покупателей услуг территории.
В программах регионального маркетинга 
в этой связи особую роль играют формирова-
ние действенной институциональной инфра-
структуры обеспечения деловой среды разви-
тия бизнеса и социальной среды партнерства 
общественных институтов и граждан, а также 
мониторинг их воздействия на повышение хо-
